Japan\u27s Failed Modernization and the Crises of Ideology : From Seclusionism to Emperorism to Corporocentrism to What? by IKEDA  Satoshi
Japan's Failed Modernization and the Crises of
Ideology : From Seclusionism to Emperorism to
Corporocentrism to What?




Historical Consciousness, Historiography, and





International Symposium in North America 2001
URL http://doi.org/10.15055/00001483
Japan~s Failed Modernization 
Ideology: From Sedusionism 
Corporocentrism to What?
and the Crises of
to Emperorism to
SatoshiIKEDA 
University ofAlberta, Edmonton, Alberta, Canada
Introduction
    What is wrong with the Japanese economy? N"at went wrong with the Japanese fi-
nancial system? V/hy is the Japanese government unable to do anything effective to help 
the situation? Would Koizumi's privatization be the solution to the problem when similar 
neoliberal policies brought financial and economic crises to so many countries already? As 
Heisei Recession of the 1990s turned into Heisei Deflation in the early years of the twenty-
first century, these questions dominate the debate on Japan. This paper is yet another attempt 
at tackling these questions, but it does so by bringing in a perspective that is usually unused 
in the current debate. The perspective employed in this paper, the world-system perspective, 
places Japanese experience in a larger and longer framework of world historical transforma-
tion from the sixteenth century. In addition to this perspective which is often criticized to be 
Euro-centric, the paper brings in the East Asian regional perspective. The exercise attempted 
here places Japan in the context of world and regional historical transformation so as to derive 
insights and lessons that would augment the understanding gained from the studies using a 
single-country, short-term perspective. 
    'M
e interpretation that this paper presents is that Heisei Deflation is the manifestation 
of Japan's third failure at modernization following the first failure in the middle of the nine-
teenth century and the second in the middle of the twentieth century. The first two failures 
manifested in the form of the failure to maintain seclusion and the defeat at the World War 
11, respectively. These failures marked the end of the cycles of modernization which I call the 
Tokugawa Cycle and Meiji Cycle. Japan in the last quarter of the twentieth century and early 
years of the twenty-first century showed another failure at the end of the third cycle of mod-
ernization, the Showa Cycle. Also, in each cycle of modernization there existed the ideology 
that united and motivated the Japanese, i.e., seclusionism, emperorism, and corporation-
centrism (or corporocentrism). As Japan's modernization faced failures, these ideologies also 
faced crisis. For Japan to overcome the current round of "failure", the paper argues that it is 
necessary to expand the scope of historical understanding to include East Asia and the rest of 
the world. In particular, Japan needs to establish an East Asian regional economic and politi-
cal arrangement to gain political sovereignty and economic autonomy from the West. 
    The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides clarification 
regarding the concepts, perspective, and methodology used. This will be followed by the 
examination of the historical process of Japan's modernization in order to identify the world-
systemic process that led to Japan's failures at modernization and the crises of respective ideol-
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ogy. A close examination of the current situation would identify the world-systemic process 
that brought about Heisei Deflation. Also examined are the relationship between Japan and 
its East Asian neighbors in modern transformation and the relationship between the East 
and the West. This will be followed by the suggestion for possible paths Japan could take and 
what would be the ideology that would lead in those directions. The concluding section sum-
marizes the argument and draws general observation.
Concepts, Perspectives, and Methodology 
    Before entering discussion, we need to clarify the basic terms, such as "Japan," "modern-
ization," and "ideology." Japan is the term that expresses the totality of the Japanese-speaking 
people with institutional arrangement that reproduces their state, economy, and society. The 
territorial boundaries of the Japanese state expanded and contracted in the past four centu-
ries. But what defines Japan here is not its territory, but the people with their institutions that 
reproduce Japanese-ness in terms of language, culture, and identity. 
    Modernization is a term that carries a huge baggage of historical and theoretical claims 
and counter-claims. Usually, the term is synonymous with material growth, Westernization, 
secular governance, orientation that privileges science over traditional ways of thinking, and 
so forth (e.g. Sil 2002: vi-xvii). Instead of attempting to use a single 'ideal' type definition as 
in the case of Weberian sociology, modernization in this paper is used to refer to processes 
of historical transformation in the past four centuries (from the sixteenth century to the 
present). In the examination of this historical process, I attempt to identify the objectives of 
modernization specific to different cycles of Japan's modernization. The success and failure 
of modernization is judged against the alleged objective of modernization and not against an 
ideal type. The term ideology in this paper designates the predominant mode of thinking that 
served to mobilize the Japanese towards the objective of modernization. For a state to func-
tion effectively there needs to be the mandate, as well as a collective identity that motivates 
the people. Ideology in this sense is a shared sense of identity, value, and destination. 
    In the following I attempt an interpretation of the Japanese history of modernization. 
Special attention is paid to the concomitant modernization in East Asia and in the modern 
world-system. East Asia refers to the area composed of the states that participated in the 
China-centered tributary system which turned into a regional tributary trade system from 
the seventeenth century. I will be using the East Asian regional perspective that was advanced 
primarily by Kawakatsu Heita and Hamashita Takeshi (Kawakatsu 1991; Hamashita and 
Kawakatsu 1991; Hamashita 1994; 1997). 
    A complementary perspective used here is the world-system perspective (Wallerstein 
1974; 1980; 1989; Chase-Dunn 1989; Hopkins and Wallerstein 1980; 1982). ̀ Ihe modern 
world-system is a conceptual tool proposed by the world-system researchers for the analysis of 
modern history. The system came into being in the sixteenth century as an inter-state system 
with axial (single) division of labor. The system covered the European countries (East, Cen-
tral, West, and Scandinavian) in the beginning, but it expanded through waves of incorpora-
tions until the entire world is incorporated in the nineteenth century. In relation to Japan, the 
world-system was synonymous with the West until the nineteenth century since Japan was 
outside the world-system, but as Japan became a significant player of world historical trans-
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formation from the late nineteenth century, the Japanese trajectory is closely intertwined with 
that of the world-system. Conceptually, the world-systemic transformation in the twentieth 
century onward refers to the system-wide transformation, which at times may not represent 
transformation in specific locations. More importantly, systemic transformation is largely 
propelled by the actions of key actors, such as the US (as a state) and transnational corpora-
tions in the late twentieth century. The utility of the image of system-wide transformation lies 
in the fact that it allows us to contrast the relative transformations of its parts without losing 
sight of the way in which the heterogeneous parts comprise the whole. In this way we want to 
maintain our human capacity and privilege to totalize and abstract for a better understanding 
of the parts and the whole simultaneously and relationally. 
    The exercise in this paper uses the methodology of historical sociology advanced by Ter-
ence K. Hopkins who provided methodological and theoretical insights for many world-sys-
tem researchers (Hopkins 1982a; 1982b). This methodology uses historical processes (both 
reproductive and transformative) as the vehicle for the understanding of historical trans-
formation, with attention paid to intended and unintended consequences of actions and 
reactions taken by the historically existing agencies. Theory as a universal claim has no place 
in this methodology since history is a single phenomenon that defies conventional scientific 
method based on observer's neutrality and the repeatability of events. Instead, the research 
objective is to provide a new interpretation of history. A claim of causal relationship is pos-
sible for interaction among actors, but the overall trajectory of history cannot be given as a 
pre-set destination as claimed by historicists (Popper 1957). Historical sociology allows us to 
deconstruct and reconstruct our historical knowledge by ceaselessly offering new, critical, and 
challenging interpretations.
Japanese Cycles of Modernization 
    Japan's transformation from the sixteenth century to the present includes a significant 
expansion of productive capacities, substantial population increase, transition from samurai 
rule to constitutional monarchy, and from a rigid and feudalistic status hierarchy to meritoc-
racy based on education and skills. In this section, I suggest that there were three cycles in 
Japan's modernization in the last four centuries. Each cycle accomplished certain achievement 
but ended with a failure. The first cycle is the Tokugawa cycle that started in the middle of the 
sixteenth century and ended in 1868. The second cycle started in 1853 and ended in 1950 
and this cycle is called the Meiji cycle. The third cycle started in 1945 and continues today, 
and it is called the Showa cycle. These cycles do not completely overlap with the conventional 
Tokugawa, Meiji, and Showa periods. 'Ibis is because the names of the conventional periods 
were borrowed to designate the cycles of modernization that had started before the respective 
period begun and continued after the periods ended. Each cycle enshrined its objective of 
modernization in an ideology that united and mobilized the Japanese people. But the institu-
tion that was created for the attainment of the objective turned into part of the problem that 
led to the eventual failure of modernization and the crisis of accompanying ideology. Let us 
take a quick glance at each cycle. 
    Major characteristics of each cycle are summarized in Table 1. The first cycle started 
with the introduction of the firearms by the Portuguese in the middle of the sixteenth cen-
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tury (1543). This was part of European expansion in the sixteenth century. But in Japan 
the Catholic priests and merchants did not cause epidemic disaster as they did in Americas. 
Instead, they accelerated the pace of Japan's unification under samurai rule. Also, with rising 
productive capacity both in agriculture and craft manufacturing, the merchant class rose to 
prominence and accelerated the momentum for samurai unification. The Tokugawa cycle was 
a process of modernization where the samurai class established domination over the peasantry 
and merchant class through the monopolization of the means of violence and the control 
of internal and external commercial activities. For the establishment and maintenance of 
the samurai rule, Catholic priests were expelled, contact with the extra-Japanese world was 
restricted, and the Japanese merchants/navigators' external commercial activities were cur-
tailed. The ideology of seclusionism/isolationism was invented by the Mito School and it was 
elevated to the status of being Japan's ancestral law inherited from the pre-Tokugawa years. 
Although samurai rule was effective in preventing overseas merchant activities and keeping 
Europeans away, seclusion was a failure since it left Japan unprepared for eventual encroach-
ment by the Western powers as a result of military obsolescence and industrial retardation. 
The Commodore Perry's visit to Tokyo Bay in 1853 shook up the ruling class and the ideol-
ogy of seclusionism faced crisis. The Tokugawa bureaucrats signed on unequal treaty, break-
ing the 'ancestral' law of seclusion, and invited their own demise. Japan's modernization in 
the Tokugawa cycle, in the end, resulted in a failure in the sense that it could not maintain 
seclusion and that Japan was semi-colonized under extra-territoriality and the lack of tariff 
autonomy. 
    The Meiji cycle from 1853 was a response to the world-systemic process of incorpora-
tion of East Asia in the nineteenth century. The East Asian countries were colonized or semi-
colonized by the Western powers, and Japan's objective of modernization in this cycle was to 
escape colonization through industrial promotion and military buildup. The state power was 
unified and consolidated with the ideology of emperorism, and Japan defeated the Russian 
Navy and restored tariff autonomy. While modernization in the Meiji cycle was successful 
in the sense that Japan gained the status of a powerful country in the interstate hierarchy, 
Japanese imperial over-extension prepared the path of its own destruction. The military elite 
class in the end caused numerous war casualties both inside and outside Japan and inflicted 
the large-scale devastation of the country. Japan lost sovereignty between 1945 and 1950, and 
in these years the ideology of emperorism was subsumed in crisis. The demise of the Meiji 
institution (military establishment) was concomitant to the consolidation of US hegemony, 
and from the 1950s, Japan has been a semi-sovereign state integrated into the US military ap-
paratus. Japan failed to realize its objective of modernization in this cycle, i.e., making Japan 
a powerful state, and the accompanying ideology, emperorism, was scrapped as the ideology 
that united the Japanese. 
    `Ihe Showa cycle started from the condition of war devastation, and the objective of 
modernization in this cycle was material expansion through industrialization. Under the con-
dition of semi-sovereignty, Japan was granted favorable treatment by the US for economic 
development. Japan took advantage of easy access to resources in the Southeast Asian coun-
tries and to US technology and markets under US free-enterprise imperialism. The objective 
of the US hegemonic project was to secure access by the US corporations to any resources or 
business opportunities anywhere in the world. Even though Japan lost sovereignty by giving 
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up independent military and allowing the US to keep its troops in Japan, the Japanese people 
were united for the pursuit of material ' expansion with the ideology of corporocentrism. The 
Japanese government created the financial system that channeled credit from the banks to the 
industrial corporations at low cost, and the Japanese corporations created mutual stockhold-
ing arrangements to prevent takeover by domestic and external competitors. Japanese workers 
were trained to become docile and loyal workers. The Japanese institutional arrangement, 
which was often called "Japan Inc." successfully fostered high rates of economic growth and 
accomplished its objective of material growth by the 1970s. 
    However, after accomplishing the objective in this round of modernization, the Ja-
pan Inc. transformed itself into the source of problem. In the 1980s, the major industrial 
corporations 'graduated' from indirect financing by the banks, but the banks continued to 
expand under bureaucratic protection. The financial authority and the financial corporations 
became the major culprit of the bubble economy and subsequent bubble burst. The major 
Japanese corporations started reducing wages and scrapped commitment to employment se-
curity, while the Japanese politicians and bureaucrats turned the government into the source 
of embezzlement, bribery, and corruption (Ikeda, 2002). The bubble economy brought the 
Heisei Recession of the 1990s that turned into the Heisei Deflation in the early years of the 
twenty-first century (Ikeda, 2004b). 
    The ideology of corporocentrism is in crisis since the major corporations are reducing 
full-time workers, cutting down supplier affiliation with the smaller companies, and transfer-
ring capital out of Japan in the form of accumulated foreign assets and overseas plants. Once 
what was good for the corporation was also good for the workers, but the interest of the cor-
poration today is at odds with the workers. just as the officers of the imperial army brought 
disaster toward the end of the Meiji cycle, high officials in the government and the upper 
management in major corporations have been the major culprit for material decline, moral 
decay, and social degradation at the end of the Showa cycle. This failure at modernization in 
the Show cycle, however, was not the result simply of Japan's internal development. There was 
a significant change in the rules of the game of accumulation at the world-system level.
Changes in the World-Systemic Rule of Accumulation 
    This change started in the 1970s as the US government and corporations took actions 
to counter the seeming erosion of their politico-military and economic domination in the 
world. While their policies and strategies might be based on misconceived theory and often 
invited unexpected consequences (like demanding Japanese yen appreciation expecting to 
reduce Japan's bilateral trade surplus), the end result was a change in the regime of capitalist 
accumulation. The global accumulation regime shifted from the growth regime to the 
distribution regime. Under the growth regime a part of working class was integrated into 
the system as the recipient of the fruit of growth. In contrast, income transfers from the 
poor to the rich (both within and between countries) without overall growth became the 
primary mechanism of accumulation under the distribution regime (Ikeda, 2004a). Table 2 
summarizes the major characteristics of these accumulation regimes. 
    There are many institutional rearrangements that accompanied the regime change. The 
direction of development has shifted from national economy to neoliberal globalization as the
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barriers of international transactions in goods, services, money, and information have been 
greatly removed through multilateral and regional liberalization agreements. The key node 
of accumulation has shifted from product and process technology to finance, marketing, and 
networking. At the same time, the source of monopoly rent (or the key node of accumula-
tion) has shifted to the management of intellectual property right and the control of strategic 
commodity, especially oil, money, and weapons. The key players in the economy once were 
national corporations that enjoyed privilege of state protection and promotion. Under the 
distribution regime large-scale transnationa-1 corporations dominate the world economy. The 
role of the state used to be corporate promotion and providing worker welfare, but neoliberal 
globalization forced the government to reduce worker welfare and to expand the space for 
private sector through privatization of public services, deregulation, and liberalization. In the 
area of global currency management, the Bretton Woods System was replaced by liberalized 
arrangement in the 1970s. After major currencies appeared to create regional sphere of influ-
ence in the 1980s, the US dollar emerged as the global currency in the 1990s. ̀ Ihe US dollar 
became the privileged currency in global transaction, account settlement, fund raising, and 
speculation, creating US dollar hegemony in the world. By forcing other countries to run 
trade surplus to obtain US dollar, the US is enjoying lump-sum transfer of value from the rest 
of the world in the form of trade deficit and capital surplus. 
    From this observation, we can argue that current financial debacle in Japan is partly a 
result of the change in the rules of the global accumulation game. The old Japanese institu-
tions stopped functioning because they do not function well under the new rules of the game 
of global competition. '1he new rule set by the US and imposed on Japan through bubble 
and bubble-burst and US demand for liberalization is also challenging the ideology that 
supported the Showa cycle of modernization. Once it was believed that what was good for 
the corporation was good for the Japanese. While supporting the major corporations, the 
Japanese government took care of those who were not incorporated into the wealth creation/ 
distribution circuit of the major corporations. Today the major corporations are severing its 
tie with the workers and shutting off the workers from the fruit of corporate activities. The 
Japanese government is still channeling enormous funds into the corporate sectors, thus re-
distributing taxpayer (worker) income to the corporations. ̀ Ihe coexistence of the ideologies 
of neoliberal globalization and corporocentrisin benefits Japan's major corporations at the 
expense of the smaller size companies, consumers, workers, and individual investors. 
    This world-systemic explanation of Japan's third failure at modernization prepares us 
to imagine possible directions for Japan to escape from the current debacle. But for a better 
comprehension of the possible alternatives, it is necessary for us to examine Japan's relation 
to the East Asian process of modernization as well as the relationship between the East and 
the West. This is because the choice of future direction is greatly influenced by what kind of 
relationship Japan would establishes with its East Asian neighbors.
East Asian Regional System and Modernization 
    The history of East Asian modernization can be conceptualized into three cycles (see 
Table 3). The first cycle is called the tributary trade system cycle in the sixteenth century 
through the eighteenth century. In this cycle the Sino-centric tributary system was trans-
104
Japan's Failed Modernization and the Crises of Ideology
formed into a tributary "trade" system where merchant trade expanded in addition to official 
tributary trade. At the same time, smaller sub-systems of tributary trade were formed in the 
periphery of China. Japan was integrated into the tributary trade system in the seventeenth 
century onward without official tributary relationship with China, while Japan pursued mi-
nor-Sino-centrism by creating its own diplomatic/trade relationship with Korea, Ryukyu, 
and Holland (the 'Western barbarians' were recognized by China as one of tributary coun-
tries). The regional system was characterized by the strong center (Chin Dynasty whose origin 
is Manchuria), and Japan maintained political independence vis-a'-vis China. East Asia main-
tained material superiority over the West in this cycle, which in turn invited Western aggres-
sion in the following cycle. As Western aggression eroded Chinese control in the region, the 
tributary trade cycle was taken over by the colonization cycle. 
    The colonization cycle started in the nineteenth century and lasted until the first half 
of the twentieth century when the Western powers colonize or semi-colonized the East Asian 
countries. Japan shared the same fate as other East Asian countries of being semi-colonized, 
but it turned against the East Asian neighbors as a colonizer. The center of the regional 
system, China, was weakened and the periphery, including Japan and the Western powers, 
succeeded in invading/incorporating China. Imperial aggression by the Western countries 
and Japan, however, invited vigorous anti-colonialist movements that brought an end to the 
colonization cycle. 
    The third cycle is called the post-independence cycle and it covers the second half of the 
twentieth century when the East Asian countries achieved political independence and pur-
sued national economic development (for some countries and regions, official political inde-
pendence came later as in the case of Vietnam). Japan took advantage of the situation created 
by US military domination of the countries surrounding China and engaged in opportunistic 
trade and investment activities to have easy access to natural resources in the Southeast Asian 
countries. It is possible to argue that Japan contributed to the national economic develop-
ment of these countries through technology transfer, but it was Japanese speculation money 
that was a culprit at least partially of the financial crises that plagued some East Asian coun-
tries in the late 1990s. The Japanese engagement with the East Asian modernization process, 
therefore, can be characterized as autonomy/independence in the first period, aggression in 
the second period, and opportunism in the third period. This not so commendable Japanese 
engagement with its East Asian neighbors was a counterpart of the Japanese modernization 
thrust of "leaving Asia, joining Europe." 
    There are other features of the East Asian regional system and historical processes that 
need to be identified when we discuss potential directions for Japan. The structural feature 
of the East Asian regional system is the enormity of the center and fragmented periphery. In 
contrast to the western end of the Eurasian continent where geographical boundaries created 
several countries of similar sizes, East Asia has a large flat center (China) with dominant pop-
ulation and several smaller countries surrounding China. The interstate system was formed 
by tributary relationship between China and the countries of Chinese periphery. Given this 
structural feature, the East Asian system went through certain cycles. The first is the cycle 
of the strong core/weak periphery and weak core/strong periphery. When the core is weak, 
China was often divided into multiple dynasties. The last time the core was strong was the
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seventeenth and eighteenth century, and this was followed by the phase of strong periphery 
in the form of Western and Japanese aggression. The current situation is the consolidation 
of the strong core. The second cycle involves the ethnic dimension of dynastic succession. 
From the time of the Yuan Dynasty, there has been a cycle of non-Han dynasty followed by 
the Han dynasty. The last non-Han dynasty was Chin Dynasty, and the current phase is the 
Han rule (or the communist party dynasty?) that was consolidated in 1948 in the form of 
communist revolution. 
    Another important aspect of the East Asian system is its relationship with the West. 
Prior to the modernization era, the East maintained material and civilizational superiority 
over the West (Frank, 1998). Until the West started the industrial revolution, Eastern mate-
rial superiority continued. The value of the global currency, silver, was maintained because 
the Chinese and Indians were willing to exchange cotton and silk for silver. The East held 
financial superiority over the West because the East set the value of global currency silver. 'The 
effort on the part of the Europeans and European settlers in North Americans to overcome 
their material and financial inferiority to the East led them to imperialist colonization until 
the 1950s. In the second half of the twentieth century, the East had reclaimed material su-
periority over the West. After China entered the World Trade Organization, Chinese exports 
are expanding rapidly. It is possible to argue that the abundant supply of low priced goods 
exported by China is anchoring the value of the US dollar that serves as the global currency. 
But Chinese domination in exports alone will not make China a competing power against 
the US. Japan is a good example of being an export powerhouse that was subordinated to the 
US financially. In order for China to take the upper hand in the global accumulation game, 
it is necessary to create a financial system that works for China's advantage because earnings 
in US dollar are subject to devaluation. Accumulation in US dollar assets means that Chinese 
earnings are brought back to the US to give the US further purchasing power without ben-
efiting the Chinese. This is just like the Japanese experience where a huge dollar asset holding 
does not help the Japanese economy. Therefore, Eastern domination in material production 
in the twenty-first century has not yet been accompanied by financial liberalization from US 
dollar hegemony.
Japan!s Future Scenarios 
    What are the possible directions for Japan if it is to depart from the defunct Showa 
cycle of modernization? What will be the ideology that supports alternative paths? In order to 
examine the possible directions, this section proposes three scenarios for the Heisei cycle of 
modernization. They are 1) status quo scenario, 2) neoliberal globalization scenario, and 3) 
regionalization scenario. Table 4 summarizes key features of these scenarios. 
    In the status quo scenario, the current policy continues. The current reform policy pur-
sued by the Koizumi cabinet is far from what would be advanced by neoliberal economists. 
Due to traditional LDP politics and long-lasting relationship between the regulators and 
regulated, the Koizumi's reform is simply denationalizing ownership of the national corpora-
tions without changing the relationship between the regulators and the regulated. The policy 
of pumping public fund to the banks to cancel non-performing loans is the continuation of 
corporate welfare measures, a typical pork-barrel politics Japanese-style. The Japanese cor-
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porations that were protected by the government in the Showa cycle had turned into the 
parasite of the Japanese economy, while those internationally competitive corporations have 
graduated from Japanese state promotion. The Koizumi reform does not touch the corporate 
sector, and the old ways of doing business will sink the Japanese economy under the distribu-
tion regime where market efficiency determines survival/failure. With a shrinking economy, 
Japan will be out-shined by China, and subordination to the US will continue. The ideology 
of corporocentrism continues to exist to justify corporate welfare policies, but the workers 
will be increasingly separated from the fruit of corporate prosperity. 
    In the neoliberal globalization scenario, neoliberal policies are implemented and the 
Japanese economy transforms fundamentally. Japan follows the path taken by many develop-
ing countries that are forced to liberalize and deregulate under accumulated debt and IMF/ 
World Bank structural adjustment programs. The key feature of this scenario is that the state 
loses its traditional role of economic regulation. Through deregulation and liberalization with 
sufficient corporate accountability, the market discipline dictates in the product and labor 
markets. The ideology of individualism becomes predominant, and the workers are forced 
to compete for the shrinking opportunity of corporate success while the majority of work-
ers experience downward mobility just as in the case of many developing countries where 
neoliberal policies were introduced. Neoliberalism also will prevail as a dominant ideology, 
not as the ideology that unites the people but as the ideology that justifies unequal income 
distribution, a result of unfettered market competition. The Japanese corporations that are 
internationally competitive will 'East Asianize' and globalize their operation and cease to be 
'Japanese' corporations. In turn, the East Asian economies are Japanized in the sense that they 
further introduce Japanese product and production technologies. The East Asian economy in 
this scenario will emerge as the predominant center of world production, but it is subordi-
nated to the US dollar hegemony, resulting in the significant leakage of the fruit of develop-
ment to the US through financial manipulation. The semi-sovereignty situation continues for 
Japan and many East Asian countries due to the lack of self-protection capability, and China 
may become subordinated to the US as China's economic dependency on US markets and 
US-controlled oil grows. 
    In the regionalization scenario, Japan gives up the past paths of modernization that led 
Japan to repeated failures. The fundamental problem with the current Japanese economy is 
the lack of the effective circuit of credit/investment. Japanese surplus held by the household 
and corporate sectors will be directed for mutually beneficial investment in East Asia without 
being wasted in the global financial casino where the house, the US, is the only gainer. This 
can be achieved by the formation of the East Asian financial system with a regional currency 
and clearance mechanism. The cooperative and mutually beneficial financial arrangement 
will be complemented by the trade arrangement that promotes regional sustainabiliry. The 
Achilles heal in this scenario is the control of energy production and supply, a key node of 
accumulation currently held by the US and the major oil companies. Through the creation 
of peaceful relationship with the Central Asian countries and Russia, together with the pro-
motion of petroleum-independent technologies, this bottleneck can be overcome. The char-
acteristics of East Asian capitalism, i.e., egalitarian distribution with state supervision of the 
market, will create a viable alternative to neoliberal globalization. The ideology that directs
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this development will be sustainable East Asian regionalism. This is a path that has been re-
jected by the Japanese in the past, but this is the way that would emancipate Japan from the 
semi-sovereign status vis-a'-vis the US and put Japan back in East Asia. Also, this is the way 
East Asia can overcome subordination to US dollar hegemony and achieve the autonomy 
for the people of East Asia that was sought from the time of Western colonization in the 
nineteenth century.
Condusions
    This paper presented an interpretation of the history of Japanese modernization from a 
world-system and East Asian regional perspective. The current debacle of the Japanese econ-
omy is understood as a result of the changes in the rules of accumulation game at the world 
level. 'Ihe possibility of escaping the economic decline and political subordination to the US 
lies in a path where Japan return to East Asia as a contributing and peaceful neighbor. Japan's 
need for US military protection will be over when peace is brought to the region through 
cooperation. Each of the three scenarios explored above have some forms of manifestation in 
Japan today. It is expected that the path that will be chosen in the end depends on the choice 
made by the Japanese based on their historical consciousness. 
    To conclude our discussion on Japan's modernization, let us attempt stocktaking of 
modernization as a project for the entire humanity. Modernization for the majority of non-
European people has been brutal and devastating. It was colonial subordination under West-
ern imperialism which continues even today in different forms. It has been impoverishment 
and a disappearing hope of development under neoliberal globalization in the past three 
decades. If modernization was a human project to bring material welfare, health, and peace 
for the entire humanity, the project has failed miserably. With the longest life expectancy and 
the income level that is among the highest in the world, Japan has achieved modernization 
in this sense. However, most people in the world are not enjoying the material benefit of 
modernization, and Japan's achievement is eroding due to declining income and deteriorating 
social conditions. Continuing Western domination and unequal distribution of the fruit of 
modernization is the source of violence, misery, and premature death. If Japan were to be a 
part of the solution and not a part of the problem, Japan has to seek a path that leads to the 
emancipation of the humanity from hunger, sickness, and war. This path is not concordant 
with individualism, neoliberalism, corporocentrism, or the policy of blindly following US 
unilateralism. Instead, the ideology that unites the Japanese people with the people of East 
Asia and beyond should be pursued.
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Table 1. Japan's Three Cycles of Modernization
  Tokugawa Cycle 
1543-1868 
Birth of the system, 












    Meiji Cycle 
1853-1950 
Last wave of incorporation, 











   Showa Cycle 
1945-Present 










MOF, BOJ officials, 
Bank Managers 
Material decline, moral 
decay, social degradation
               Table 2. Changes in the Rule of Accumulation 
                      1950s-1970s 1980s-present 
Development orientation National economy Neoliberal Globalization 
Regime name Growth Regime Distribution Regime 
Key node of accumulation Product and process technology Finance, marketing, net-


























               Japan's Failed Modernization and the Crises of Ideology 
          National corporations Transnational corporations 
          Corporate promotion, worker welfare Get out of the way of 
                                              corporations 
          Co-management of the major currencies USdollar domination 
       Table 3. East Asian Modernization Cycles 
      Tributary Trade System Colonization Cycle Post-independence 
     Cycle Cycle 
      16C-18C 19C-1940s 1950s-present 
  e Tributary trade system, Western colonization/semi- National economic 
      minor Sino-centrism colonization, resistance development 
      Dependent independence Aggressor Opportunist 
      Strong center (Non-Han Weak center, peripheral Core consolidation 
      dynasty) aggression (Han or Communist 
                                                Party rule?)
      Eastern superiority Western aggression Westerndomination 
           Table 4. Japan's Future Scenarios 
Scenario I Scenario 2 Scenario 3 
Status quo scenario Neoliberal globalization Regionalization scenario 
                         scenario 
Corporate (Bank) welfare Deregulation, liberalization East Asian regional 
                                            integration
Corporate welfare-ism Neoliberal globalism, East Asianism 
                    individualism 
Gradual sinking Prosperous corporations, Greater regional self-
                        squeezed workers, sufficiency, regional
                        polarization, social autonomy 
                      degradation 
Subordination to US and East Asianization of Fair trade relation, regional 
China Japanese company, stability, regional autonomy 
                      Japanization of East Asian 
                          economy 
Eastern materia I Eastern material superiority, Eastern autonomy 
superiority, US financial US financial domination 
domination 
                                           I I I
